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designed to pursue the "legitimate na-
tional, state, and community interest in 
maintaining a decent society." See United 
States v. Moses, 339 A.2d 46, 54 
(D.C.App., 1975). 
The District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals recently found the opportunity to 
consider this statute again in reviewing 
the conviction of Diane Dinkins. Dinkins 
v. United States, 374 A.2d 292 (D.C. 
App., 1977). In affirming this conviction, 
the court, sitting en bane, arrived at a 
construction of the statute which 
broadens considerably its reach and which 
some have found to be outrageous. 
Diane Dinkins was standing on a corner 
in Washington, nattily attired in a red 
sweater, blue miniskirt, and knee length 
boots. Obviously impressed by Diane's 
sartorial display, a plain clothes police 
officer who had been cruising the area in 
his private car pulled near the sidewalk 
where Ms. Dinkins was standing. The 
officer rolled down his window and said 
"Hi" to Ms. Dinkins, who thereupon ap-
proached the car. A conversation ensued 
which consisted of typically loaded ques-
tions from the police officer and typically 
suggestive responses from Ms. Dinkins. 
The officer first asked how much the 
lady's services would be, and when Ms. 
Dinkins finally became explicit as to her 
repertoire, she was arrested. After her 
conviction in a bench trial, she appealed 
to the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals. A division of this court decided to 
reverse the conviction. After the panel's 
opinion wa~ circulated to the other judges 
on the court, the usual practice, a rehear-
ing en bane was scheduled, and the full 
court affirmed. 
The appellant claimed that "no solic-
titation [was] made for prostitution since 
Miss Dinkins conduct was responsive ... 
rather than [initiatory]." 374 A.2d at 
295. 
The court disagreed, and in analyzing 
the wording of the statute noted that the 
word solicif does not specifically appear 
and thus its directive-active connotation 
as a gravamen of the offense was not ap-
plicable to §22-2701. 374 A.2d at 295. 
Instead, the court indicated (after research 
in Webster's Third New International Dic-
tionary) that words such as "entice" and 
"address" which are present in §22-2701 
can describe conduct which is not neces-
sarily active nor initiative in tenor. 
Through this analysis, which rivals the 
medieval philosophical speculation of the 
number of angels on the head of a pin, 
conduct which is responsive and even 
passive in reaction to a reasonably clever 
police officer can be proscribed by law. 
The court stated its conclusion as 
follows: 
We hold that appellant's attire, her 
prolonged presence on the street cor-
ner, her approach to a complete 
stranger, her extremely suggestive ver-
bal responses to the officer, her prompt 
discussion of financial terms, and her 
ready arrangement for a room are 
legally sufficient, when taken together, 
for a fact finder to conclude guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 374 A.2d 
at 296. 
The dissenting opinions noted that the 
Court of Appeals has interpreted the law 
as a solicitation statute. Id. at 297. The 
gist of the dissent was that "it must be 
affirmatively demonstrated that [she] in-
vited, enticed, persuaded, or addressed 
. . . for purposes of prostitution." Id. at 
298 (emphasis in original). The minority 
indicated that the police officer's remarks 
themselves could well be taken to con-
stitute violations of §22-2701. Id. 
The second dissenting opinion stated: 
I had always thought that if a prostitute 
is merely standing on a corner she may 
not be convicted of [a violation] of this 
statute simply because she is a prosti-
tute. Only if she solicits for prostitution 
may a conviction follow. I would have 
thought a construction of the statute 
was that simple, but now it seems that 
it is not. 374 A.2d at 299. 
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In Basch v. George Washington Univer-
sity, 370 A.2d 1364 (D.C.App., 1977), 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
considered a claim by plaintiff medical 
students that the defendant university 
breached its contract with them by charg-
ing tuition increases far exceeding those 
listed in the medical school bulletin. 
The George Washington University 
Bulletin: School of Medicine and Health 
Sciences, published for the 1974-1975 
year, listed estimated tuition increases of 
approximately $200.00 per year over the 
base tuition of $3200.00 for 1974-1975. 
Many students, according to ap-
pellants/plaintiffs, contended that their 
decision to attend George Washington 
was influenced by these estimated costs. 
When the university issued a "Statement 
of Tuition Rates" in January, 1975, 
revealing tuition costs far in excess of 
those outlined as estimates by the 
bulletin, the students complained in a suit 
in D.C. Superior Court. Treating a defen-
dant's motion to dismiss as one for sum-
mary judgment, the trial court found that 
as a matter of law the students were not 
entitled to relief. The case was taken to 
the Court of Appeals . 
The issue before the court was whether 
the university was to be contractually 
bound to projected tuition increases. The 
appellants renewed their claim that it was. 
Considering the fact that medical school 
tuition costs in the District have reached, 
or will reach $12,000 per year at George 
Washington and Georgetown universities, 
this claim on the part of the students was 
certainly an urgent one. 
The court began its discussion by not-
ing the general rule that terms set down in 
a university bulletin can become part of 
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the contractual relationship between the 
university and its students. 370 A.2d at 
1366. The court indicated, however, that 
bulletin listings of projected tuition in-
creases does not support finding a con-
tractual obligation. [d. This examination 
must be made in light of principles of con-
tract interpretation. 
This construction must be made with 
an eye to the circumstances and to the in-
tent of the parties. Terms of the document 
are to be given their common meaning. 
[d. at 1367. The court quoted from the 
RESTATMENT OF CONTRACTS §32 (1932): 
An offer must be so definite in its 
terms, or require such definite terms in 
the acceptance, that the promises and 
performances to be rendered by each 
party are reasonably certain. 
Viewing the language of the Bulletin as 
a whole, and with a reasonable view 
toward the language surrounding the 
remarks concerning tuition costs, the 
court stated that" [tl hese words expressed 
an expectancy by the University regarding 
future increases. This is not a promise 
susceptible of enforcement." 370 A.2d at 
1368. 
In essence, the court found that the 
university attempted to provide rational 
guidelines for tuition costs. It had not in-
tended to create an inflexible obligation 
on its part to maintain fixed tuition rates 
when the economic realities of operating a 
university medical school would defeat 
that attempt at price stability, and force 
the school to operate at a loss. Such an 
unknown economic variable did arrive on 
the scene when the federal government all 
but eliminated. its support for medi-
cal/health educational programs in Wash-
ington by a decrease in funding through 
the District of Columbia Medical and Den-
tal Manpower Act. 
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Growth Of 
Vicarious 
Liability 
Checked 
by John Jeffrey Ross 
When tort law assigns to an institution 
liability for the injurious acts of an in-
diVidual, the role of the law of civil ac-
countability as social engineering 
becomes especially clear. An important 
legal concept which assists this function is 
the theory of respondeat superior, where 
an entity actually remote from the trans-
action resulting in injury is held responSi-
ble because the acting defendant is, or ap-
pears to be, the agent of the party 
ultimately liable. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland re-
cently considered the liability of the 
remote principal founded on apparent 
agency, but in reversing a judgment of the 
Court of Special Appeals, refused to 
assign responsibility beyond the immedi-
ate parties to the event. B.P. Oil Corpora-
tion v. Mabe, 279 Md. 632, 370 A.2d 
554 (1977). 
Claude Mabe drove into a service sta-
tion because his car was low on fuel and 
water. He asked the attendant for water to 
fill the radiator, and the employee pro-
duced a can filled with a volatile liquid. 
When Mabe poured this into the hot 
radiator there was an explosion. Mabe was 
injured, and he sued. 
The gas station was adorned with Bri-
tish Petroleum insignia: uniforms, gas 
pumps, a station vehicle, and a large sign 
exhibiting the BP letters and colors. Mabe 
had entered the station because he " ... 
always buy[sl BP gasoline, always deal[sl 
with BP." 279 Md. at 636, 370 A.2d at 
557. He therefore decided to deal with BP 
in court too, and named the corporation 
as a defendant, claiming that the injuries 
"stemmed directly from the negligent and 
tortious conduct of the defendants and 
their agents ... " 279 Md. at 634, 370 
A.2d, at 556. 
The jury returned a verdict for Mabe. 
As consumers they were apparently con-
vinced that Mabe's reliance on the ample 
exhibition of BP insignia as indicative of 
good products and service meant that he 
thought he had entered a station under 
the competent direction of the defendant 
corporation. The trial court, however, en-
tered a judgment n.o.v., "finding 'no 
agency of any kind .... " 279 Md. at 634, 
370 A.2d at 556. The Court of Special 
Appeals reversed, finding there was agen-
cy by estoppel. Mabe v. B.P. Oil Corpora-
tion, 31 Md.App. 221, 356 A.2d 304 
(1976). (See The FORUM, Vol. VII, No. 
2, p. 26) 
After granting certiorari, the Court of 
Appeals examined two theories of action: 
actual and apparent agency. In consider-
ing the former, it found that the owner of 
the station, Faison, leased the premises 
from a third party, further leased the sta-
tion to B.P. which in turn, by a reciprocal 
agreement, leased it back to Faison. The 
rents between B.P. and Faison were con-
tingent on the amount of gasoline sold, 
payment for such fuel being the actual 
rental fee. Other facts dispositive of the 
actual agency theory were the lack of sal-
ary and commission from B.P., and ab-
sence of control by the corporation in the 
hiring and payment of the station's 
employees. lt was found that Faison con-
trolled the operation of the station and 
that B.P.'s role was limited to that of sell-
ing its products to Mabe (and only when 
he was able to pay for them). 
The court concluded that there was no 
direct control by B.P. over the operation 
